Crashes and Crises: Lessons from a History of Financial Disasters

Rated 4 out of 5 by from Extremely interesting! A good course! Probably to get the most out of it, you'd need a background in finance, but even at that, it's a good discussion of what happened and why, and the long-term effects. A little more details would've made it perfect, but it was definitely worth it!
Date published: 2020-07-26
Rated 5 out of 5 by from Understandable Explanations The lecturer gives understandable explanations for complicated financial situations and actions
Date published: 2020-07-19
Rated 4 out of 5 by from These history lessons still apply today. I happen to like history but I am not too interested in financial matters, but based upon other reviews I decided to buy this course. The professor did a great job of explaining the financial parts in understandable language as well as covering the historical context of the crash/crisis/issue he was covering. He was also good at pointing out common themes and how these themes are still applicable today. So, in the end, I learned a great deal about the history of finance and problems that came up and also gained a better understanding of finance while at the same time learning some lessons that I can use today.
Date published: 2020-06-25
Rated 5 out of 5 by from Excellent Economic Crashes & Crises History Course First, my undergraduate minor was in economics. Second, this course is really an economics history class. Next, economics is not a subject where fantastic graphics can help the presentation, such as astronomy. Fortunately, Professor Fullenkamp is a great presenter. Seldom did I check to see how much longer the lecture had to go. It was immensely helpful that the lecturer sat during 98% of the lecture and didn't do the Great Courses' shuffle on the famous rectangular rug. I had heard of a Ponzi scheme, but now I learned the details behind it. I lived through the 1987 stock market crash, the dot.com bubble, rogue traders at various financial firms, and the Great Recession. Now I received an understanding from hindsight and 50,000 feet above the events. The presentations were very grounded. The end conclusion I gained is that crashes and crises are often caused by 1) hubris, 2) poor character, and 3) any thinking that you can predict the future.
Date published: 2020-06-08
Rated 5 out of 5 by from This is about humans and power. Explosive. This is a historical perspective from the view of an economist. Very interesting.
Date published: 2020-05-24
Rated 5 out of 5 by from Fascinating I found this lecture series to be clear, concise and very detailed. In fairness though, I may not be the average Listener, having been involved in creative finance for my entire career. I believe that the vast majority of the course would be relatively easy to follow for someone with a limited background in finance, though there are clearly some areas that may warrant extracurricular research. There were a few areas (regarding the south sea and Mississippi bubbles) where I had trouble following some aspects of the funding details (as I listened while riding my bike). A good course is one which encourages you to think (and perhaps do a bit of googling to learn more.) This course does that.
Date published: 2020-05-06
Rated 5 out of 5 by from HIGHLY RECOMMENDED Even before the Dot.com bubble and bust, I have been interested in what causes crashes. A couple of good books on the topic include DEVIL TAKES THE HINDMOST, as well as John Galbraith's THE GREAT DEPRESSION. These were very valuable sources for me, someone who has no calculus or statistics background and who has no connection to the financial services industry. Prof. Fullenkamp takes a very effective approach at explaining difficult topics. Obviously, judging from his thumbnail C.V. he has an banking insider's credentials. However he manages to present complicated material without talking down to an audience without his technical background. He does use formulas and graphs, but they are simplified enough that someone with algebra could readily understand the concepts. In THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE he explains how John Blunt orchestrated a strategy where the financially stressed English government swapped government debt for the company's shares. In The MISSISSIPPI BUBBLE we see how John Law, an English fugitive from justice (a dueling murder) went to France and by 1720 managed to get himself installed as the key figure in French economic policy and administer a complicated scheme swapping government bonds and company IOUs to inflate the money supply as a way out of huge debt from its costly war with Spain. ROGUE TRADERS AT SOCGEN AND BARINGS is fascinating in that the rogues in both cases followed a pattern quite similar to one another. That is, they both worked in the back office until they learned the ins and outs of compliance and reporting. They then moved to the trading floor where they acted on their inside knowledge of how to cover their tracks. They would pyramid and double down on their losses. In UNHEDGED! LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT he takes us through the means by which economist Merriweather managed to "invest" $100 BILLION at 30X hidden leverage! This was achieved by recruiting a Nobel-prize winner, ex-Federal Reserve official, non-existent disclosure and losses so big that it took the Federal Reserve itself to arrange a rescue package. My conclusion at the end of this splendid course is this: it seems to me that if the financial rogues cause enough damage to endanger a big financial institution in which the higher-ups may be involved, their punishment will be light or non-existent. In the cases of Bernard Madoff or Michael Milikin, on the other hand, where they couldn't implicate higher management of a big institution, they would be the ones paying a high price for their misdeeds. Bottom line, I find this view from the inside of large financial institutions very instructive.
Date published: 2020-04-27
Rated 4 out of 5 by from In the Goldilocks zone I just finished the course. I thought that Professor F. did a good job of balancing content between technical theory and story content. He kept it interesting and informational for the layman. His summation at the end of each lesson helped make concrete the mistakes and behavior that led to the crisis. I think the course could have been improved by a final lecture that pulled all the crises together to identify the warning signs, and how this could help the individual who is investing.
Date published: 2020-01-03
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Crashes and Crises: Lessons from a History of Financial Disasters
Course Trailer
Fintech, Crypto, and the Future of Disaster
1: Fintech, Crypto, and the Future of Disaster

Professor Fullenkamp begins the course with the enormous influence of technology on today’s investing, which brings with it a frightening potential for crashes and crises. Cover the Flash Crash of 2010—a dip in the market that was hugely amplified by programmed trading. Then, delve into the phenomenon of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, which rely on an innovation called blockchain technology.

29 min
The Con Men Charles Ponzi and Ivar Kreuger
2: The Con Men Charles Ponzi and Ivar Kreuger

Investigate two of the most notorious con men who ever lived: Charles Ponzi, after whom the Ponzi scheme is named, and “Match King” Ivar Kreuger, who employed an elaborate variant of Ponzi’s swindle. Analyze the three ingredients that most Ponzi schemes share. Above all, learn to identify and be wary of investments that are too good to be true.

29 min
A Boom in Busts
3: A Boom in Busts

Contrast the freewheeling financial market of today with the staid system of the immediate post-World War II era. Were financial markets more stable in the past than they are now? How did the present system evolve? What type of market is normal: the steady and predictable kind or the chaotic and sometimes destructive one? In answering these questions, discover why we live in an era of busts.

29 min
The Tulip Bubble
4: The Tulip Bubble

The 17th-century tulip bubble is a classic case of futures trading run amok. But how much did tulip mania resemble today’s speculative markets, as opposed to ordinary gambling? Learn the truth behind this notorious financial bubble, while reflecting on the problem of deciding a fair price for an asset, such as tulip bulbs. Also, consider how bubbles start and end.

28 min
The South Sea Bubble
5: The South Sea Bubble

Relive the “Wild West” days of the British stock market in the early 18th century, when a financially-strapped government and a public craze for investing created ideal conditions for one of history’s most brazen stock manipulators. Trace John Blunt’s use of the South Sea Company—and bribery—to generate a stock-buying frenzy, making him fabulously rich—until the bubble inevitably burst.

28 min
The Mississippi Bubble
6: The Mississippi Bubble

Delve into the details of the Mississippi bubble, an early 18th-century financial crisis sparked by speculation in the anticipated wealth of French Louisiana. Learn how the bubble’s instigator, John Law, a Scottish gambler and convicted murderer, gained control of the French economy and pushed ideas that were ahead of their time—so far ahead that they plunged France into economic collapse.

27 min
Holes in the Ground: Mining Stock Frauds
7: Holes in the Ground: Mining Stock Frauds

Mining companies were the internet start-ups of the 19th and early 20th centuries, offering a chance to strike it rich—or, more likely, go broke. Focus on the swindling strategy of George Graham Rice, who earned a fortune (and several prison terms) by manipulating mining stock. Discover that Mark Twain and future president Herbert Hoover both had close brushes with shady mining ventures.

29 min
The Panic of 1907
8: The Panic of 1907

Until 1920, panics were a recurring feature of economic life in the United States. What caused them and how were they cured? Investigate the Panic of 1907 and the part played by legendary banker J. P. Morgan in stemming a threatened wave of bank failures. The gold standard was an obstacle to managing panics, and the Federal Reserve System, established in 1913, proved to be a powerful antidote.

29 min
Hyperinflation in Germany and Zimbabwe
9: Hyperinflation in Germany and Zimbabwe

Plunge into the economic nightmare of hyperinflation, learning how it happens, when it ends, and the policies that put nations at risk. The classic case of hyperinflation is post-World War I Germany, which faced a multitude of demands on a financial system already crippled by the war. Also, analyze the mistakes that sparked hyperinflation in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s.

31 min
The Crash of 1929
10: The Crash of 1929

Dissect the notorious Wall Street crash of 1929, starting with the economic conditions that led to a feverish speculative boom during the “Roaring ’20s.” Survey investment practices of the day, some of which are now outlawed. Trace the rise in stock prices into the fall of 1929, when a normal market correction seemed underway. Probe explanations for why it suddenly turned into a crash.

30 min
The Great Contraction of 1931–1933
11: The Great Contraction of 1931–1933

In a financial disaster called the Great Contraction, one-third of all banks in the United States failed between 1931 and early 1933. Examine the causes of this collapse in confidence, which also affected building and loan associations, made famous in the movie It’s a Wonderful Life. Appraise government attempts to stem the crisis, which led to legislation including the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.

30 min
The Savings and Loan Crisis
12: The Savings and Loan Crisis

Wade into the quagmire that trapped savings and loan institutions in the 1980s and ’90s. Once a thriving, low-profit source of home mortgages, the industry fell victim to a combination of high interest rates, well-intentioned government deregulation, and a wave of predatory, unscrupulous managers. The ensuing debacle left the American taxpayer with a bill of $160 billion in 1995 dollars.

30 min
The Crash of 1987
13: The Crash of 1987

Meet a modern-day Frankenstein’s monster, a human creation on the loose— in this case, computerized trading. Discover how the rage for portfolio insurance controlled by computer algorithms, combined with a rapidly rising market and skittish investors, sparked the Black Monday crash of October 19, 1987, during which the Dow Jones index lost 23 percent of its value.

30 min
Japan’s Lost Decade
14: Japan’s Lost Decade

In the 1980s, the Japanese economy seemed unstoppable. Then, it came to a screeching halt, miring the nation in more than two decades of economic stagnation. What went wrong? Analyze Japan’s postwar brand of capitalism, focusing on how its regulatory, political, and banking systems created a “bubble economy”—until the global economy and regulatory climate abruptly changed and the bubble burst.

31 min
Bankers Trust Swaps
15: Bankers Trust Swaps

Learn the ropes for interest rate swaps, the most popular financial derivative in the world. Then, see how a complex form of swaps, brokered by Bankers Trust in the early 1990s, led to huge losses for some famous corporations and an ensuing round of bitter lawsuits. The case holds lessons for anyone investing in financial instruments that they don’t fully understand.

29 min
Asia, Greece, and Global Contagion
16: Asia, Greece, and Global Contagion

Analyze the cause of currency crises, using the 1997 collapse of the Thai baht as test case. Uncover why such events can happen suddenly with little chance for a government to stop the precipitous fall in its currency’s value, and also why the U.S. dollar is not immune. Consider the role of currency speculators, such as George Soros, who famously broke the Bank of England in 1992.

27 min
The Orange County, California, Bankruptcy
17: The Orange County, California, Bankruptcy

Discover how an elected official with a self-admitted seventh-grade proficiency in math earned fabulous returns as treasurer of Orange County, California, and then plunged the system into the largest municipal default in United States history up to that time. His strategy—and downfall—relied on two financial instruments: repurchase agreements and inverse floater bonds. Track down where he went wrong.

29 min
The Dotcom Bubble
18: The Dotcom Bubble

The rise of the internet in the 1990s spawned companies that existed only online; had never earned a profit; had no rational business plan; and, yet, generated enormous enthusiasm in their initial stock offerings. Learn why the market ignored time-tested standards and suffered the inevitable crash. Focus on the role of intangible assets in the dotcom boom and its aftermath.

29 min
Rogue Traders at SocGen and Barings
19: Rogue Traders at SocGen and Barings

Test Professor Fullenkamp’s theory that all rogue traders are the same by studying two infamous insiders: Jerome Kerviel, who cost the French bank Societe Generale more than $6 billion, and Nick Leeson, whose errant trading bankrupted Baring Brothers. Find out how trading firms are organized, and pinpoint the Achilles heel that allowed both men to go rogue.

29 min
Unhedged! Long-Term Capital Management
20: Unhedged! Long-Term Capital Management

Long-Term Capital Management was a hedge fund with everything going for it: well-heeled investors, a dream team of economists and managers, and banks willing to loan hundreds of millions of dollars with no questions asked. In 1998, it all went terribly wrong in a debacle that threatened to take down Wall Street. Spotlight the basic rules of finance that were ignored by LTCM and its banks.

27 min
The London Whale and Value at Risk
21: The London Whale and Value at Risk

Explore a risk-management tool called value at risk, or VaR. Developed by economists at J. P. Morgan in the 1990s, VaR estimates the largest loss that a given investment strategy can be expected to sustain under normal market conditions. Chart the successes of this model—and its spectacular failure in an incident involving a high-rolling trader nicknamed the “London Whale.”

29 min
The Goldilocks Economy and Three Bads
22: The Goldilocks Economy and Three Bads

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. economy was enjoying a long spell of economic growth that struck economists as just right. But that was before the “three bads” surfaced: bad monetary policy, bad private-sector behavior, and bad financial regulations. See how self-interest and overconfidence blinded investors, borrowers, and regulators to the financial crisis that exploded in 2007–2008.

29 min
Subprime Debt and the Run on Wall Street
23: Subprime Debt and the Run on Wall Street

Inspect the unprecedented run on the international financial system in 2007–2008, which led to the worst recession since the Great Depression. Learn the ins and outs of subprime mortgages, collateralized debt obligations, and structured investment vehicles, which fueled a U.S. housing-construction boom that involved most of the world’s major financial institutions.

28 min
China’s Shadow Banks
24: China’s Shadow Banks

China was largely unaffected by the 2007–2009 global economic meltdown. But that doesn’t mean it’s immune to crises. Focus on China’s shadow banking, which is the provision of banking services by non-bank institutions. The practice is not as sinister as it sounds, but it is subject to abuse. In China’s case, the widespread use of shadow banking courts trouble that could lead to financial disaster.

29 min
Connel Fullenkamp

I love that the The Great Courses gives me a chance I wouldn't otherwise have to teach people who love to learn. I really enjoy the challenge of putting together courses that are engaging and useful!

ALMA MATER

Harvard University

INSTITUTION

Duke University

About Connel Fullenkamp

Professor Connel Fullenkamp is Professor of the Practice and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Economics at Duke University. He teaches financial economics courses, such as corporate finance, as well as core courses, such as economic principles. In addition to teaching, he serves as a consultant for the Duke Center for International Development. Prior to joining the Duke faculty in 1999, Professor Fullenkamp was a faculty member in the Department of Finance within the Mendoza College of Business at the University of Notre Dame. Originally from Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Professor Fullenkamp earned his undergraduate degree in Economics from Michigan State University. In addition to receiving the Harry S. Truman Scholarship, he was named one of the university's Alumni Distinguished Scholars. He earned his master's and doctorate degrees in Economics from Harvard University, where he was also awarded a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. Professor Fullenkamp's areas of interest include financial market development and regulation, economic policy, and immigrant remittances. His work has appeared in a number of prestigious academic journals, including the Review of Economic Dynamics, The Cato Journal, and the Journal of Banking and Finance. He also does consulting work for the IMF Institute at the International Monetary Fund, training government officials around the world. He is a member of the IMF Institute's finance team, whose purpose is to train central bankers and other officials in financial market regulation, focusing on derivatives and other new financial instruments. In recognition of his teaching excellence, Professor Fullenkamp has received Duke University's Alumni Distinguished Undergraduate Teaching Award as well as the University of Notre Dame's Mendoza College of Business Outstanding Teacher Award. Along with Sunil Sharma, Professor Fullenkamp won the third annual ICFR-Financial Times Research Prize for their paper on international financial regulation.

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